Author Archive

What I’m Reading- Keynes: Return of the Master by Robert Skidelsky

So, I picked up a few books recently that I hope to finish while I’m on a glorious vacation over the next few weeks. Interestingly enough, I’m visiting the land of the man this book is based upon, John Maynard Keynes. The book, Keynes: The Return of the Master, was written by Robert Skidelsky, Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at the University of Warwick. I’m excited to study Keynes a little deeper, a man who I seem to identify with, at least when it comes to a deep passion for both economics and the arts. Money quotes from the introduction so far:

-”Nor was Keynes a tax-and-spend fanatic. At the end of his life he wondered whether a government take more than 25% of the national income was a good thing. Nor did Keynes believe that all unemployment was  caused by failure of aggregate demand. He was close to Milton Friedman in viewing a lot of it as due to inflexible wages and prices…”

-”Keynes was not an inflationist. He believed in stable prices, and for much of his career he thought that central governments could achieve price stability…”

-”I believe, though, that the recent crisis confirms the validity of the Keynesian ‘spending’ thesis. That is why the return of the Master is such an urgent necessity.”

And if you’re wondering who the heck is John Maynard Keynes, check this video out of Keynes and Hayek in the midst of a serious rap battle:

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Defend the Fed!

I know, I know, the title to this article in this day and age can be considered Bolshevik propaganda, but hear me (and a few others out) when I say the financial crisis had some conventional (and not so conventional) elements to it, calling for both conventional and non-conventional responses that seem to have been effective up to their boundaries, of course that’s the lower-zero bound.

Anyways, I’ve been hearing a lot of vehement accusations against the Fed over the crisis, most notably they kept interest rates too low for too long. Hence, this led to mis-allocation of capital which proceeded to heat up and inflate the housing bubble like a run-away hot air balloon. On the surface, this makes sense. Just coming out of the recession in the early 2000′s, the logical economic step is to lower the FF in order to stimulate aggregate demand and shift the IS curve (investment and savings equilibrium) to the right. And maybe Greenspan fell asleep at the wheel with the pedal to floor, driving the economic vehicle into an endless financial chasm.

But then I thought, “Surely there would have been more outcry against Greenspan’s policy, and his title of ‘Maestro’ would undoubtedly  been revoked, right?” The problem is that the problem is overstated.

When reading Greenspan’s response to the crisis (found here), I found many things I agreed with. He mentions the conversion of most Third World conversions to Asian-Tigers style export-oriented economies. These economies rely on savings gluts in order to accommodate their competitiveness in the global economy. In essence, “global saving intentions, of necessity, had chronically exceeded global intentions to invest.” Another big point, specifically having to do with the interest rate set by the Fed and it’s correlation to mortgage rates fell to insignificance during the boom years, hence coining Greenspan’s term, the “conundrum”

He notes, “The correlation coefficient in the U.S. between the fed funds rate and the 30-year mortgage rate from 1963 to 2002, for example, had been a tight 0.83……But the 30-year mortgage rate had clearly delinked from the fed funds rate in the early part of this decade. The correlation between the funds rate and the 30-year mortgage rate fell to an insignificant .17 during the years 2002 to 2005…”

So, when the FOMC did target a higher interest rate (which they did), the housing bubble paid no mind to the tightening and continued with more ferocity into 2005-2007, the apex of the housing bubble. Notice the correlation between the chart on interest rates, and the chart on the housing bubble:

So, in essence, demand for housing was fueled by something other than low interest rates caused by the Fed, because nearly all investors understood that the low rates of 2003-2004 was an anomaly.

Michael Woodford revealed a great analysis of this in the Journal of Economic Perspectives entitled Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis” which you can find here.

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Classical Economic’s Perspective on a Modern Issue

Political Economy for Beginners by Millicent Garrett Fawcett

I was reviewing an old book, “,” by Millicent Garret Fawcett, an incredible woman of history and wife of Henry Fawcett, first professor of Political Economics at Cambridge in the 1860′s. As I perused through the pages, one example she gives seems eerily familiar:

“…six persons, A., B., C., D., and F., desire to purchase a house; the price, therefore, of the house is raised to such a point as to oblige B., C., D., E., and F. to withdraw their demand; the only demand which remains is that of A.; the demand is therefore made equal to the supply.

It is however evident that in such a case as that just described, the price which the house fetches may be such as to provide a greater reward for the capital and labor engaged in building the house, than is current in the trade. If this is so the supply of houses will be increased as quickly as the circumstances of the case permit. But this increased supply will tend to reduce the price of houses to such a point that the reward obtained by the labor and capital engaged in the trade returns to its ordinary level. In a similar way if the price which the house fetches, yields less than the ordinary reward to capital and labor, the master builders and laborers will employ their capital and labor in other industries: the supply of houses will fall off, until prices return to such a point as to pay the capitalist and laborer the current profits and wages of the trade. This continual variation of market price, on either side of the normal price, or that regulated by cost of production, has been compared by Mr. [John Stuart] Mill to the perpetual fluctuation of the waves of the sea. ‘The sea everywhere tends to la level, its surface is always ruffled by waves, and often agitated by storms. It is enough that no point, at least in the open sea, is permanently higher than another. Each place is alternately elevated and depressed; but the ocean preserves its level’…”

Fawcett Political Economy for Beginners Sec. 2 Ch. 3

Now, this is pretty basic. Actually, about chapter 4 in a Macro 101 course. But tied to our current situation, things seem a little more complicated, despite the basic tenets of economics just rehearsed. I will get into more of the aspects of demand and supply and the housing crisis within the next few articles, if not to help organize conflicting ideas on the recession than to organize my thoughts on the issue. Many places where blame has been dealt have not been totally accurate, but for starters, Fawcett lays down the fundamental aspects of how the crisis looked. I’ll report more soon!

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