I know, I know, the title to this article in this day and age can be considered Bolshevik propaganda, but hear me (and a few others out) when I say the financial crisis had some conventional (and not so conventional) elements to it, calling for both conventional and non-conventional responses that seem to have been effective up to their boundaries, of course that’s the lower-zero bound.
Anyways, I’ve been hearing a lot of vehement accusations against the Fed over the crisis, most notably they kept interest rates too low for too long. Hence, this led to mis-allocation of capital which proceeded to heat up and inflate the housing bubble like a run-away hot air balloon. On the surface, this makes sense. Just coming out of the recession in the early 2000′s, the logical economic step is to lower the FF in order to stimulate aggregate demand and shift the IS curve (investment and savings equilibrium) to the right. And maybe Greenspan fell asleep at the wheel with the pedal to floor, driving the economic vehicle into an endless financial chasm.
But then I thought, “Surely there would have been more outcry against Greenspan’s policy, and his title of ‘Maestro’ would undoubtedly been revoked, right?” The problem is that the problem is overstated.
When reading Greenspan’s response to the crisis (found here), I found many things I agreed with. He mentions the conversion of most Third World conversions to Asian-Tigers style export-oriented economies. These economies rely on savings gluts in order to accommodate their competitiveness in the global economy. In essence, “global saving intentions, of necessity, had chronically exceeded global intentions to invest.” Another big point, specifically having to do with the interest rate set by the Fed and it’s correlation to mortgage rates fell to insignificance during the boom years, hence coining Greenspan’s term, the “conundrum”
He notes, “The correlation coefficient in the U.S. between the fed funds rate and the 30-year mortgage rate from 1963 to 2002, for example, had been a tight 0.83……But the 30-year mortgage rate had clearly delinked from the fed funds rate in the early part of this decade. The correlation between the funds rate and the 30-year mortgage rate fell to an insignificant .17 during the years 2002 to 2005…”
So, when the FOMC did target a higher interest rate (which they did), the housing bubble paid no mind to the tightening and continued with more ferocity into 2005-2007, the apex of the housing bubble. Notice the correlation between the chart on interest rates, and the chart on the housing bubble:
So, in essence, demand for housing was fueled by something other than low interest rates caused by the Fed, because nearly all investors understood that the low rates of 2003-2004 was an anomaly.
Michael Woodford revealed a great analysis of this in the Journal of Economic Perspectives entitled “Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis” which you can find here.